CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW--CONTEMPT
PROCEEDINGS-DUE
PROCESS RIGHTS OF CONTEMNOR INCREASE WHEN IMPRISONMENT IS ORDERED FOR DIRECT CONTEMPT-In re Daniels, 118

N.J. 1, 570 A.2d 416 (1990).
The summary power to punish contemptuous behavior' is an
inherent element of the judicial structure.2 Statutes and rules of
court and procedure3 have supplemented case law in the development of this judicial authority. In essence, the court is vested
with the ability to adjudicatefacie curiae4 affronts to its authority5
I Such behavior has traditionally been defined as "an act or omission substantially disrupting or obstructing the judicial process in a particular case." Dobbs,
Contempt of Court. A Survey, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 183, 185 (1971).

2 See Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 6 (1952); United States v. Shipp, 203
U.S. 563 (1906); Ex Parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 302-03 (1888). See also Comment,
The Role of Due Process in Summary Contempt Proceedings, 68 IowA L. REV. 177 (1982)
(advocating the narrowing of the use of summary contempt).
3 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1976) authorizes a federal court to exercise summary contempt power. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:10-1 (West 1987) serves as the NewJersey state
corollary to the aforementioned federal provision. Concerning rules of court and
procedure, FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(a), entitled Summary Disposition, provides in full:
A criminal contempt may be punished summarily if the judge certifies
that the judge saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt
and that it was committed in the actual presence of the court. The
order of contempt shall recite the facts and shall be signed by the
judge and entered of record.
Id. N.J. CT. R. 1:10-1 entitled Contempt in the Presence of the Court provides
"[c]onternpt in the actual presence of a judge may be adjudged summarily by the
judge without notice or order to show cause. The order of contempt shall recite the
facts and contain a certification by the judge that he saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt." Id.
4 The phrasefacie curiae is synonymous with " 'under the eye or within the view
of the court,' or 'in open court' or 'in the face of the court.' " Cooke v. United
States, 267 U.S. 517, 536 (1924). The labels "contempt infacie curiae" and "direct
contempt" are used interchangeably. In re Yengo, 84 N.J 111, 131, 417 A.2d 533,
544 (1980) (Handler, J., concurring).
5 See Kuhns, The Summary Contempt Power: A Critiqueand a New Perspective, 88 YALE
L.J. 39 (1978). Contempt may be categorized pursuant to two schemes: a criminal/
civil distinction and a direct/indirect distinction. See Note, The Modern Status of the
Rules Permittinga Judge To Punish Direct Contempt Summarily, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV.
553 n.1 (1987). Concerning the first delineation, the process of "labelling" contempt depends upon the purpose for citation. Id. If coercive or corrective, the contempt is civil. Id. If punitive, a criminal contempt arises. Id. The distinction is
important because the constitutional safeguards accompanying criminal trials will
become an issue in criminal contempt, but not in civil contempt. Id. See generally
United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 295-301 (1947)
(discussing requirements for civil and criminal contempt). New Jersey has discarded the term "civil" and replaced it with "relief to litigants." In re Daniels, 118
N.J. 51, 60, 570 A.2d 416, 421 (1990).
The second distinction will depend upon the manner in which the behavior
occurred. See Note, supra, at 553 n. 1. If the contumacious conduct occurred in the
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without the procedural safeguards attendant other criminal proceedings.6 Traditionally, for conduct to constitute direct defiance it need only occur in the presence of the court.7
Recognizing, however, the vast potential for bias and abuse,8
courts have attempted to restrict the exercise of summary process. 9 Hence, summary adjudication must be predicated upon
some showing that the chosen procedure is necessary to prevent
demoralization of the court's dignity and authority.' 0
The trend toward narrowing the scope of a court's summary
contempt power stems from immense concern over the resulting
deprivation of due process." Both federal and state courts have
attempted to reconcile the necessity for maintaining judicial decorum with the constitutional rights accorded individuals.' 2 In
presence of the court it is direct contempt. Id. Whereas, indirect contempt occurs
outside the presence of the court. Id. See, e.g., In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 274-76
(1948); Cooke, 267 U.S. at 534-35. This distinction will determine the manner of
adjudication. See Note, supra, at 553 n. 1. Unlike direct contempt, indirect contempt
provides for notice. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(b); NJ. CT. R. 1:10-2.
6 Kuhns, supra note 5, at 41 n.6. Summary contempt proceedings do not encompass the right to indictment, trial by jury, right to counsel, notice or hearing.
Id. (citations omitted). See Sacher, 343 U.S. at 9.
7 See Sacher, 343 U.S. at 11.
8 See In re Mattera, 34 NJ. 259, 272, 168 A.2d 38, 45 (1961). In summary proceedings,"[t]he court is at once the complainant, prosecutor, judge, and executioner." Id.
9 See Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162, 164 (1965). Harris represents an
early attempt by the United States Supreme Court to restrict the parameters of the
summary contempt power. Id. The Harris Court adopted an "exceptional circumstances" standard whereby summary power is limited to those situations whereby a
judge is threatened or court proceedings are disrupted. Id. To curb this vast
power, the Court defined it as "[t]he least possible power adequate to the end proposed." Id. at 165 (quoting Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 231 (1821)).
The New Jersey Supreme Court has also adopted this rationale. In re Yengo, 84
N.J. 111, 122, 417 A.2d 533, 539 (1980).
10 See Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968). The United States Supreme Court
recognized that summary contempt "[a]lso rests on the need to maintain order ....
IId. at 210. The New Jersey Supreme Court further restricted the justification for summary adjudication, noting that "[t]he sole credible basis•.. is necessity,
...that the judiciary be not frustrated." In re Fairlawn Educ. Ass'n, 63 N.J. 112,
114-15, 305 A.2d 72, 73 (1973) (involving civil contempt of teachers refusing to
obey court order against strike efforts). See Sacher, 343 U.S. at 36 (Frankfurter, J.,
dissepting).
I I See Sacher, 343 U.S. at 9-11. The power, by its nature, involves a diminishment
of due process rights. Id.
12 See Note, supra note 5, at 558. To the contrary, it has been held that no conflict
exists between the maintenance of judicial order and individual liberty. Ex Parte
Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 307 (1888). Rather, it is proposed that the protection of one is
the fulfillment of the other. Id. at 306-07. Moreover, it is proffered that individual
liberties are in fact protected through maintenance of an orderly trial. Id. See also
Note, supra note 5, at 559-60.
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furtherance of this goal, some courts have formulated standards
which extend greater due process protections to alleged contemnors.13 The New Jersey Supreme Court has embraced the
federal sliding scale method 14 for assessment of due process requirements and has applied it to contempt cases.' 5 Such a
scheme is premised upon the degree of reliability fostered by the
proceedings and the particular liberty interest involved.' 6 Recently, the New Jersey Supreme Court in In re Daniels 17 broadened the application of the sliding scale approach.' 8 The Daniels
court held that in cases of direct contempt, the due process rights
of the contemnor increase when custodial sentencing is
ordered. ' 9

On March 18, 1986, James B. Daniels, an attorney with a
New Jersey Public Defender's unit, represented his client in the
first day of pre-trial hearings. 20 Denying two of Mr. Daniels' motions, 21 the trial court subsequently took exception to the attorney's non-verbal response to the rulings.22 Judge Alfred J.
Lechner Jr. issued a warning to the attorney-defendant that such
further behavior would result in a contempt citation.23 Following
a brief recess, the defendant apologized to the court claiming
that no disrespect was intended.24
After jury selection, but prior to swearing in, Mr. Daniels asserted a Gilmore motion25 and requested a mistrial.26 The trial
13 See Comment, supra note 2, at 186. See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 382 U.S.
162 (1965) (employing an "exceptional circumstances" standard).
14 In re Daniels, 118 NJ. 51, 64, 570 A.2d 416, 423 (1990). Under the standard
articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), evaluation of due process
claims involve three main factors: (i) the government's interest, (ii) the risk of error
and potential value of supplemental safeguards, and (iii) the effected private interest. Id. at 335.
15 In re Daniels, 219 N.J. Super. 550, 575, 530 A.2d 1260, 1273 (App. Div. 1987)
(citing Greenberg v. Kimmelman, 99 N.J. 552, 494 A.2d 294 (1985); New Jersey
State Parole Bd. v. Byrne, 93 N.J. 192, 460 A.2d 103 (1983)).
16 In re Daniels, 118 NJ. at 63-64, 570 A.2d at 423 (1990).
17 Id. at 51, 570 A.2d at 416.
18 Id. at 64, 570 A.2d at 423.
19 Id. at 71, 570 A.2d at 426-27.
20 Id. at 55, 570 A.2d at 418. The underlying criminal trial involved first degree
robbery. In re Daniels, 219 N.J. Super 550, 555, 530 A.2d 1260, 1262 (App. Div.
1987).
21 Daniels, 118 N.J. at 55, 570 A.2d at 418-19. Additionally, the court denied Mr.
Daniels' motion to take judicial notice of scholarly articles. Id., 570 A.2d at 419.
22 Id. at 55-56, 570 A.2d at 419. The record reflects that Mr. Daniels was "sitting
there shaking his head, smiling and being disrespectful." Id.
23 Id. at 56, 570 A.2d at 419.

24
25

Id.
Id. The defendant claimed that the prosecution had discriminately used its
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judge criticized the motion as untimely and the defendant's physical reaction to denial as disrespectful.27 Specifically, Judge
Lechner stated, "[p]ut on the record right now, you laughed, you
rolled your head, you threw yourself back in your seat."12 8 The

court discharged the jury, terminated the proceedings and pronounced Mr. Daniels in contempt of court. 9 Prior to sentencing,
Judge Lechner afforded the defendant an opportunity to be
heard.3 0 Asserting that the response was merely "human," Mr.
Daniels objected to the court's characterization of his behavior.3 '
Mr. Daniels stated, "I did nothing other than sit back in my chair,
put my head down and cover my eyes when the [c]ourt ruled
[against the Gilmore application]. 3 2 However, the defendant
declined the court's offer to call witnesses in his favor.3
The trial judge, ascertaining that the attorney's conduct constituted "an open threat to the orderly procedure of the
[c]ourt, ' ' 3

imposed a fine of $500.00 and ordered a two-day cus-

todial sentence.3 5 Five days later, the court issued
a supplemen36
tal order outlining the reasons for the penalty.

Pursuant to New Jersey Court Rule 2:10-4, s7 the defendant
appealed to the New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
peremptory challenges to exclude certain segments of the population from the jury.
Id. (citing State v. Gilmore, 199 N.J. Super. 389, 489 A.2d 1175 (App. Div. 1985),
aff'd, 103 N.J. 508, 511 A.2d 1150 (1986)).
26 Id.

27 Id. at 56-57, 570 A.2d at 419.
28 Id. at 57, 570 A.2d at 419.
29 Id.

30 Id.

31 Id. Mr. Daniels also reasserted his protest of the court's Gilmore ruling. Id.
The court responded, "Don't raise your voice." Id.
32 Id.
33 Id., 570 A.2d at 420. The court clerk and other eyewitnesses subsequently
filed affidavits stating that they witnessed no laughing or other audible disruption
by the contemnor. In re Daniels, 219 N.J. Super. 550, 564-65, 530 A.2d 1260, 1267
(App. Div. 1987). However, the sworn statements did not become part of the record and thus, were outweighed by deference accorded trial judges on review. Id.
34 Daniels, 219 N.J. Super. at 563, 530 A.2d at 1267.
35 Daniels, 118 N.J. at 58, 570 A.2d at 420. The defendant obtained a stay of both
the fine and imprisonment. Id.
36 Id. Because the original order did not contain all of the requisite information
under N.J. CT. R. 1:10-1, a supplemental order was mandated. Daniels, 219 N.J.
Super. at 562, 530 A.2d at 1266. In the second order, Judge Lechner described the
contemnor's behavior as " 'expressions of disrespect,' including 'shaking his head,
laughing, and rolling his eyes and head to express his disapproval and scorn.' " Id.
37 See N.J. CT. R. 2:10-4. New Jersey Court Rule 2:10-4 provides: "[e]very summary conviction by a court for contempt shall be reviewable on the law and the
facts. The appellate court shall render such judgment and order for enforcement
thereof as it deems just under the circumstances." Id.
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which affirmed the determination of contempt, but vacated the
sentence of imprisonment.3 8 Judge Michels, writing for the
court, noted that the harm suffered by the judiciary in this matter
was not sufficient to warrant imprisonment. 39 Because of the important due process implications raised on appeal, the New
Jersey Supreme Court granted the defendant's petition for certification4" and his appeal as of right pursuant to New Jersey Court
Rule 2:2-1 (a) (2). 4 ' The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the
ruling of the appellate court and held that the defendant's conduct constituted contempt, but that he was not afforded due
process.42

Although the summary contempt power boasts deep roots in
the Anglo-American judicial system, its common law history is
clouded. 4 ' Recognition of this judicial feature as a weapon to
maintain order and dignity in the courtroom is found in Blackstone's Commentaries.44 Toward the end of the 18th Century, the
contempt power was subjected to close scrutiny. This was principally due to arbitrary judicial exercise of the contempt power.45
Overwhelming sentiment calling for restraint led Congress to
pass an act regulating the exercise of summary contempt
power.46 These restrictive measures were met with judicial
resistance.47
38 See In re Daniels, 219 N.J. Super. 550, 592, 530 A.2d 1260, 1282 (App. Div.
1987). The appellate court rejected the defendant's claim that a good faith motive
converted contempt from direct to indirect. Id. at 572-73, 530 A.2d at 1272. The
court.further found no procedural irregularities except for the custodial sentence.
Id. at 567, 530 A.2d at 1269.
39 Id. at 592, 530 A.2d at 1282.
40 See In re Daniels, 109 N.J. 496, 537 A.2d 1287 (1987).
41 See N.J. CT. R. 2:2-1(a)(2). This Rule regarding appealable determinations
provides, "in cases where, and with regard to those issues as to which, there is a
dissent in the appellate division .
" I.
Id.
42 d. at 70-74, 570 A.2d at 426-28.
43 See In re Fairlawn Educ. Ass'n, 63 N.J. 112, 114, 305 A.2d 72, 73 (1973).
44 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 124-26. The rationale proffered by early
courts for the summary power was one of punishment for the disturbance of public
justice. See Note, supra note 5, at 554.
45 See In re Buehrer, 50 N.J. 501, 514, 236 A.2d 592, 599 (1967). In fact, several
judges were impeached because of their unfettered use of summary power to deal
with out-of-court comments on judicial decisions. Id.
46 Crimes and Criminal Procedure: Contempts, ch. 99, § 1, 4 Stat. 487 (1831)
(current version at 18 U.S.C. §§ 401,402 (1976)). This statute first outlined offenses which are triable summarily, including misbehavior in the actual presence of
the court, misbehavior of an officer in his official duty, and violation of a court
order. Id. The New Jersey legislature has adopted similar provisions in N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:10-1 (1987).
47 See Comment, supra note 2, at 177.
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In 1952, the United States Supreme Court in Sacher v. United
States48 held that the trial judge's authority to summarily punish
contempt occurring in the court's presence is not extinguished
when adjudication is delayed until after a trial.49 In Sacher, several defendants and defense counsel were adjudged guilty of contempt for behavior exhibited during the trial. 50 The contemnors
claimed that delay in adjudication converts a summarily-vulnerable contempt into one requiring notice and hearing. 5 ' Justice
Jackson, writing for the Court, maintained that "summary" is not
the equivalent of "instant." 52 According to the Sacher Court, the
primary consideration was efficiency in the trial process.53 The
Court determined that if in the trial judge's opinion the trial's
circumstances require delayed contempt judgment, the power to
punish absent procedural safeguards remains preserved.54
Although drawing heavily on federal precedent, New Jersey
has developed its own law of contempt. 55 In In re Carton,5 6 the
48 343 U.S. 1 (1952). The case involved the trial of eleven communist leaders
who were charged with violating the Smith Act. See Dennis v. United States, 341
U.S. 494 (1951). Sacher is a prime example of early federal contempt law because it
thoroughly capsulized prior decisions, such as In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948);
Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517 (1925); Ex Parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289 (1888).
49 Sacher, 343 U.S. at 11.
50 Id. at 3.
51 Id. at 7. The petitioners alleged:
[T]hat this power of summary punishment expired by reason of two
circumstances: (1) that the trial judge awaited completion of the trial,
or which time its progress could no longer be obstructed and hence, it
is said, summary action had become unnecessary; and (2) that he included in the certificate a charge that the contemptuous instances
were the result of agreement between counsel which, if it existed, was
not made in his presence. Therefore, it is argued that petitioners
could not be convicted or sentenced except after notice, time for
preparation of a defense, and hearing, probably before another judge,
as provided in Rule 12(b).
Id.
52 Id. at 11. The term summary refers to the procedure which dismisses the formality and delay which results from service of process, conducting hearings, discovering evidence, and all other formalities of an ordinary trial. Id. at 9.
53 Id. at 10.
54 See id. at 11. Since the conduct occurred in the presence of the court, additional inquiries designed to unveil the truth were unnecessary and inefficient. See
Note, supra note 5 at 557.
55 In re Daniels, 219 N.J. Super. 550, 583-84, 530 A.2d 1260, 1277 (1987). New
Jersey courts have described the reach of summary contempt power in more expansive terms than the federal courts, "[but] it is important not to overstate the magnitude of the differences between the federal and New Jersey standards for
contempt." Id. at 550, 594, 530 A.2d 1260, 1283 (1987) (Skillman, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted).
56 48 N.J. 9, 222 A.2d 92 (1966).
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New Jersey Supreme Court vacated a judgment of imprisonment
and fine for contempt because of the erroneous nature of the
trial court's order. 57 The attorney contemnor was held in contempt for his refusal to sign a pre-trial order which he believed
58
did not adequately reflect his client's position.
The court's opinion in Carton is significant for its articulation
of the mens rea requirement.59 Chief Justice Weintraub posited
that the contumacious conduct must be accompanied by a willfulness capable of being assessed by the trial judge. 60 To this evaluation, the contemnor is permitted to offer rebuttal evidence.6"
The court continued that although a good faith motive may not
excuse willful disobedience, it may be a mitigating factor in determining whether prosecution is necessary.62 The Carton Court
further aligned itself with post-Sacher federal cases recognizing
necessity, as well as presence in court, as a precondition to summary contempt power.63
Fourteen years after Carton, the New Jersey Supreme Court
in In re Yengo6 tackled the vast due process implications inherent
in summary process. 65 The Yengo Court addressed the issue of
whether an attorney with an inexcused absence during a trial can
be cited with direct contempt, justifying summary disposition.66
Here, the New Jersey Supreme Court deviated from federal precedent and held that unexplained absence or tardiness accompanied by an inadequate excuse constitutes direct contempt. The
Yengo Court reasoned that because the proffered explanation for
absence was frivolous, in essence, both absence and excuse ocId. at 24, 222 A.2d at 100.
Id. at 14, 222 A.2d at 94.
59 Id. at 19-20, 222 A.2d at 97-98. The court recognized that this element must
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
57
58

6

Id.

Id. No matter how obvious the guilt, the alleged contemnor must be afforded
the opportunity to produce evidence as to his state of mind. Id.
62 Id. at 25, 222 A.2d at 101.
63 Id. at 21, 222 A.2d at 98-99.
64 84 N.J. 111, 417 A.2d 533 (1980).
65 Id.
66 Id. at 115, 417 A.2d at 536. The attorney went on an unexpected trip to Bermuda during the trial without notifying the court. Id. at 118, 417 A.2d at 537.
67 Id. at 124, 417 A.2d at 540-41 (citing In re Clawans, 69 N.J. Super. 373, 174
A.2d 367 (App. Div. 1961), certif. denied, 36 N.J. 296, 177 A.2d 340 (1962), cert.
denied, 370 U.S. 905 (1962)).
hlie majority view is that an unexcused absence cannot constitute contempt in the presence of the court. Id. "The rationale is that,
although the absence or late arrival of an attorney can be perceived directly by the
court, the conclusion that the absence is inexcusable requires reference to facts not
immediately within the court's perception." Id. at 124-25, 417 A.2d at 541.
61
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curred in the presence of the court. 6 ' Therefore, the majority
continued that a finding of direct contempt was appropriate. 69
Addressing the contemnor's constitutional claims, the majority noted that the obstruction of trial continuity created a need
for immediate disposition and punishment. 70 This need, the
Yengo court stressed, far outweighed any procedural safeguards
provided by notice and hearing.7 '
In In re Stanley,7 2 the New Jersey Supreme Court addressed
73
the unique implications associated with professional contempt.

In Stanley, an attorney was cited for contempt due to his vituperative attitude before the court. 4 In its determination, the trial
court referred to the American Bar Association's Code of Professional Responsibility 75 and filed a report with the Ethics Committee.7 6 On de novo review the appellate division affirmed.7 7 The
New Jersey Supreme Court, on appeal, adopted the recommendations of the Disciplinary Review Board and ordered public reprimand. 78

The court explained that the purpose justifying

attorney discipline is to guard the public from attorneys not
meeting the standards of competence for members of the bar. 79
68 Id. at 126-27, 417 A.2d at 542. The court continued that "[w]here there is a
good faith excuse, although another judge may find it to be inadequate the predominant consideration should be enhancement of procedural due process for the
alleged contemnor. The offense should be treated as an indirect contempt." Id. at
128, 417 A.2d at 542-43.
69 Id. at 126-27, 417 A.2d at 542.
70 Id. at 127, 417 A.2d. at 542.
71 See id. In his concurrence, Justice Handler argued that the contemnor has an
absolute right to be informed of the charge and the opportunity to tender exculpatory evidence. Justice Handler further recognized the contemnor's right to appellate review as a judicial failsafe to correct trial court abuse. Id. at 135, 417 A.2d at
546 (Handler, J., concurring). New Jersey also provides for appellate de novo review.
Id.
72 102 N.J. 244, 507 A.2d 1168 (1986).
73 Id. See Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952). There the Court noted the
obvious conflict between attorneys' duty to zealously protect their clients' rights
and the need to maintain order in the court. Id. at 12-13. In recognition of this fine
line, Justice Jackson stressed that the Court would "[n]ot equate contempt with
courage or insult with independence." Id.
74 Stanley, 102 N.J. at 248, 507 A.2d at 1170. The trial judge asserted that the
attorney pointed his finger, made faces, laughed and directed long withering stares
at the court. Id. at 247, 507 A.2d at 1170.
75 Id. at 244, 507 A.2d 1168. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILIr
DRI-102(A)(1,5), DR7-106(C)(6) (1979).
76 Stanley, 102 N.J. at 251, 507 A.2d at 1172.

77 Id.
78

Id. at 253-54, 507 A.2d at 1173-74.

79 Id. at 253, 507 A.2d at 1173. See In re Templeton, 99 N.J. 365, 374, 492 A.2d

1001, 1006 (1985); In re Goldstaub, 90 N.J. 1, 5, 446 A.2d 1192, 1194 (1982).
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Concerning punishment, the court stressed that it must conform
to the level of misconduct.80
Sensing a need for guidance, the New Jersey Supreme Court
in In re Daniels8 1 sought to define the parameters of due process
as existing in the law of contempt. 8 2 The court began its analysis
by articulating that summary contempt proceedings do not afford
the contemnor all of the due-process requirements.8a The court
rejected the defendant's claim that the right to counsel limits exercise of the summary contempt power. 84 The attorney-contemnor insisted that no person may be jailed for an offense if denied
the right to counsel.85 The unanimous court responded that contempt proceedings have historically been characterized as "sui
generis,-neither civil actions nor prosecutions for offenses."8 6
Moreover, the court determined that due process does not require extending the sixth amendment right to counsel,8 especially
7
where the contemnor is an experienced trial attorney.
Employing a sliding scale approach,88 the Daniels Court observed that as the need for reliability and the importance of the
interest involved increase, so do the due process rights afforded
the contemnor. 89 The court next addressed the potential for error and bias inherent in summary contempt proceedings. 90 In a
systematic approach, the justices determined that the greater the
risk of mistake and personal embroilment, the greater the demand for procedural safeguards. 9 1 The court posited that when
the alleged contemptuous behavior consists of non-verbal gestures, the record on review may not adequately reveal the con80 Stanley, 102 N.J. at 253-54, 507 A.2d at 1173 (citing In re Nigohosian, 88 N.J.
308, 315, 442 A.2d 1007, 1011 (1982)). The Stanley court suggested that in assessing punishment all relevant factors should be taken into consideration. Id.
81 118 N.J. 51, 570 A.2d 416 (1990).
82 Id. at 63, 570 A.2d at 423. Despite its attempt to methodize, the court noted
that due process is a " 'dynamic concept' . .. and its 'sense of fairness cannot be
imprisoned in a crystal.' " Id. (quoting Callen v. Sherman's, Inc., 92 NJ. 114, 134,
136, 455 A.2d 1102, 1112 (1983)).
83 Id. at 62, 570 A.2d at 423.
84 Id. at 62-63, 570 A.2d at 422-23.
85 Id. (citing Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972)).
86 Id. at 63, 570 A.2d at 423 (quoting Myers v. United States, 264 U.S. 95
(1924)). See Kuhns, supra note 5, at 41. Contra Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 201
(1968)("criminal contempt is a crime in every fundamental respect..."). Id.
87 Daniels, 118 N.J. at 63, 570 A.2d at 423.
88 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
89 Daniels, 118 N.J. at 64, 570 A.2d at 423.
90 Id. at 64, 570 A.2d at 423.

91 Id.
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tempt. 92 The justices recommended that trial courts evaluate the
record and determine whether supplemental fact-finding would
clarify less graphic conduct.93 Another factor increasing the need
for reliability, the court commented, arises when the trial judge
becomes the target of insult.94 Underlying this is the recognition
that inherent in due process is the right to be heard before a fair
and unprejudiced tribunal. 9 5 If the behavior is personally directed, the court posited, the trial court must determine whether
a loss of objectivity warrants reference to another judge. 96
Although the court found no indication of bias in Judge Lechner's actions, it suggested referral to a detached judge as the better future practice. 97
In conjunction with its heightened standard of reliability, the
court next considered whether the punishment charged accorded
with the procedures employed. 98 To its formula, the court added
that the magnitude of the individual interest involved would work
to expand procedural safeguards. 9 9 The court noted that the loss
of liberty is only surpassed by the loss of life as the most intense
deprivation an individual may suffer.'0 0 Comparing the two possible punishments of fine or imprisonment, the court observed
that the latter necessarily involved more drastic consequences including the damage to reputation and possible subjection to violence while incarcerated.' 0 ' Continuing the analysis, the justices
rejected the economic/efficiency justification of the summary
0 2
contempt power when custodial sentencing is contemplated.'
The faster/cheaper rationale was found to be trifling compared
1 3
to the abandonment of a right such as liberty.
92 Id. Agreeing with the dissenting member of the appellate division, the court
determined that ambiguities in the record prevented a clear understanding of what
had occurred. Id. Therefore, unreliability was heightened. d. For further discussion of non-verbal contempt, see Dobbs, supra note 1, at 200-04 (1971).
93 Daniels, 118 N.J. at 68, 570 A.2d at 425.
94 Id. at 64-65, 570 A.2d at 423.
95 Id. at 73, 570 A.2d at 428.
96 Daniels, 118 N.J. at 68, 570 A.2d at 425. See, e.g., Offut v. United States, 348
U.S. 11 (1954) (trial judge was not permitted to hear matter due to loss of
impartiality).
97 Daniels, 118 N.J. at 73, 570 A.2d at 428.
98 Id. at 65, 570 A.2d at 424.
99 Id. at 64, 570 A.2d at 423.
100 Id. at 65, 570 A.2d at 424.
101 Id. The court also recognized the particular impact incarceration would have
on an officer of the court, such as an attorney. Id.
102 Id. at 65-66, 570 A.2d at 424.
103 Id, The court viewed economics as "not generally been thought sufficient reason for abandoning our great constitutional safeguards aimed at protecting free-
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Applying the general procedural principles, the justices proposed several guidelines to aid the issue at bar and future analysis of contempt.' 4 The Daniels Court recommended immediate
assessment by the trial judge of the gravity of misconduct.' °5 If
the misconduct rises to the level of contempt, the court posited
that the trial judge must determine whether summary adjudication is necessary to maintain order and dignity. 10 6 Furthermore,
the court asserted that courts must determine whether the record
contains sufficient facts which describe the misconduct. 10 7 The
justices, next, explained that if the misconduct involves a personal confrontation, the court should consider the need for an
unbiased judge.'08 Finally, the court advanced that if there is a
threat of imprisonment and no immediacy is needed, a formal
charging process with an unbiased judge should be instituted. 0 9
Applying these guidelines, the court agreed that Mr. Daniels' behavior was clearly contemptuous. 1"' In reaching its conclusion,
the court asserted that the conduct occurred in the presence of
the judge and was "if not 'an open threat to the orderly procedure of the court.... a flagrant defiance of the person and presence of the judge before the public.' ""'
The court addressed the defendant's argument that lawyers
who get excited over unfavorable rulings do not necessarily intend to obstruct justice." 12 In this regard, the justices espoused
the federal minimum standard."13 The court continued that the
actor must have known or should reasonably have been aware
that his voluntary action was wrongful."l 4 In the present case the
court acknowledged the prior warning issued Mr. Daniels and
found it rather dispositive on the question of intent.' 5 Further,
dom and other basic human rights of incalculable value." Id. (quoting Green v.
United States, 356 U.S. 165, 216 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting)).
104 Id. at 67-68, 570 A.2d at 425.
105 Id. at 67, 570 A.2d at 425. The justices recognized that a certain measure of
discretion must be maintained in the trial judge. Id. at 66, 570 A.2d at 424.
106 Id. at 67, 570 A.2d at 425. Here, the court reaffirmed the necessity rationale.
Id. The court commented that summary disposition must be accompanied by some
sense of immediacy. Id. at 61-62, 570 A.2d at 422.
107 Id. at 68, 570 A.2d at 425.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 69-70, 570 A.2d at 426. The court found the attorney's gestures to constitute a direct threat to orderly administration. Id.
I I Id. at 69, 570 A.2d at 426.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id. (quoting In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389, 400 (7th Cir. 1972)).
115 Id. at 69-70, 570 A.2d at 426.
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the court rejected the defendant's contention that he was deprived his right of allocution.' 16 Although the trial judge did not
afford the right of defense until after the defendant was found in7
contempt, the supreme court found no procedural irregularity. 1
Although understanding the defendant's obvious dismay
with the adverse ruling, the court stressed that disrespectful behavior cannot be condoned." 8 The court stated, however, that
before imprisoning the contemnor, the individual must be afforded due process protections along with the assurance that the
factfinding is reliable." 9 Further, as a practical matter, the court
commented that the jailing of an attorney cannot realistically
serve to prevent demoralization of judicial authority. 20 Since
the trial court had already terminated the proceedings, the court
continued that necessity was not even a factor in assessing appropriate punishment. 21 Although the court commented that conclusion of a trial will not necessarily limit summary powers, it may
be a factor in deciding the procedures to be applied. 22 Moreover, the court pointed out that because the case at bar had been
terminated and it involved imprisonment, the summary
proce123
dure failed to afford Mr. Daniels' due process of law.
Furthermore, the court reiterated some basic contempt propositions.1 24 The court opined that if the contempt occurs midl2 5
trial, the contemnor should be given notice of his behavior.
Later, the court determined the contemnor may explain his mis116 Id. at 69, 570 A.2d at 426. The United States Supreme Court has recognized
that it is customary to afford the right of allocution to an alleged contemnor. See
Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U.S. 496 (1972). The right to allocution is basically the right
to make a statement prior to sentencing concerning one's culpability. See Kuhns,
supra note 5, at 55.
117 Daniels, 118 NJ. at 69, 570 A. 2d at 426. The court recognized the regularity
of the procedures, namely that Mr. Daniels was informed of the charge against him
and was entitled to present evidence in his favor. Id. The justices agreed with the
appellate division's reasoning that the attorney's guilt was not actually assessed until after he had defended himself. Id. (citing In re Buehrer, 50 NJ. 501, 516, 236
A.2d 592, 600 (1967) (for proposition that an alleged contemnor is entitled to a
presumption of innocence).
118 Id. at 70, 570 A.2d at 426. See In re DeMarco, 224 N.J. Super. 105, 123, 539
A.2d 1230, 1240 (App. Div. 1988) (attorney conduct held contemptuous and not
justified as a reaction to trial court's possibly erroneous ruling).
119 Daniels, 118 N.J. at 70, 570 A.2d at 426.
120 Id. at 70, 570 A.2d at 426 (citing Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 536
(1925)).
121 Id. at 71, 570 A.2d at 426.
122 Id. (citing United States v. Lumumba, 741 F.2d 12, 16 (2d Cir. 1984)).
123 Id.
124 Id. at 72, 570 A.2d at 427.
125 Id.
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conduct. 126 The court further posited that when adjudication is
necessary and loss of liberty is contemplated, the case should be
referred to another judge unless this would jeopardize trial continuity.127 The court advanced that a referred adjudication would
be heard on the basis of a supplemented record and other relevant evidence.'2 M The court noted in such a non-summary context, the right to counsel would be afforded. 12 9 In contempt
cases where detachment of the judge is questionable, the court
added that the
contemnor should have a hearing before a differ30
ent judge.1

Finally, the court concluded that the appellate court's decision should be affirmed.'' The court based its determination on
several factors.13 2 First, the court reasoned that the trial judge
was detached from the case.13 3 Second, the court noted that the
trial judge afforded the contemnor his procedural process right
to be heard. 13 4 Although the court emphasized that they would
have preferred that another judge hear the matter, the court was
satisfied the appellate court adequately examined
the findings of
35
fact and the record to sustain the action.1
Admirably, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Daniels has attempted to capsulize and clarify an amorphous area of the law.
As a result, the court elucidated previous shortcomings relating
to certain facets of contempt proceedings. A prime example is
the observation that the efficiency rationale championed in Sacher
v. United States '3 6 pales in comparison to fundamental notions of

fairness. 13 7 Such a determination will inevitably reduce the immense possibility for abuse innate in all summary contempt proceedings. Through application of a sliding scale approach, the
Daniels Court has equipped subsequent courts with a systematic
techniqueofor evaluating due process claims.' 3 8 Most markedly,
Id.
Id.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 73, 570 A.2d at 428.
13 Id. at 74, 570 A.2d at 428.
132 Id. at 73, 570 A.2d at 428.
'33 Id.
'34 Id.
'35 Id.
136 343 U.S. 1, 10 (1952).
137 Daniels, 118 NJ. at 65-66, 570 A.2d at 424 (citing Green v. United States, 356
U.S. 165, 216 (1958)).
138 See id. at 64, 570 A.2d at 423.
126
127
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the court emphasized the value of reliability. 13 9 For multiple reasons, the court required trial courts to maintain adequate records
sufficiently reflecting the behavior and surrounding circumstances. Such an obligation may serve as a deterrent for misuse
of the summary power. Even an overly temperamental judge will
have to exercise restraint in questionable contempt cases in view
of the duty of clarity imposed by Daniels. Moreover, a lucid record detailing surrounding circumstances will better protect the
contemnor on appellate review.
The court further endeavored to reduce the potential for
prejudice by creating a failsafe in the face of personal embroilment. 140 Although the court dictates an assessment of objectivity, this burden is vested with the very target of insult, the trial
court. 14 1 Perhaps the court should have proposed a scheme providing for some independent review of possible bias. t 42 Historically, a critical limitation has been placed on the concept of
personal embroilment. That is, the doctrine only applies when
the trial judge delays citation or adjudication until completion of
the trial. 143 Therefore, the Daniels personal insult safeguard offers no protection to the contemnor who is immediately
punished.
The Daniels decision, however, does offer extensive guidance
on the element of intent of the contemnor. 44 Appellate courts
generally do not require explanation by the trial court of the
legal standard employed to appraise intent.145 The Daniels Court
furnished both trial and appellate courts with a uniform standard
of review. 146 Thus, the courts must utilize the objective/subjective measure of willfulness. 47 Despite this articulation, a formal
hearing would best determine the intentions of the alleged conId.
Id. at 68, 570 A.2d at 425.
Id. The terms "judge" and "court" are interchangeable, therefore, "contempt
of the one is contempt of the other." Id. (citing Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1,
12 (1952)).
142 See Note, supra note 5, at 578-79. A large measure of deference to the trial
court will often provide little procedural protection to the alleged contemnor. Id.
143 Id. at 579.
144 Daniels, 118 N.J. at 69, 570 A.2d at 426.
145 See Kuhns, supra note 5, at 70.
146 Daniels, 118 N.J. at 69, 570 A.2d at 426.
147 Id. (citing In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389, 400 (7th Cir. 1972)). Specifically, the
court provided that "[w]ith respect to the question of intent, 'the minimum standard is one of a voluntary action known by the actor to be wrongful or one that he
reasonably should have been aware was wrongful," Id.
139
140
141
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temnor. 148 It has been suggested that a demonstration of good
faith motive should negate a contempt charge for disruptive behavior.1 49 If such a rationale were adopted, an independent hearing on the issue of intent would be warranted. This separate
determination would be necessary to check feigned claims of
good faith.
The New Jersey Supreme Court has surpassed the United
States Supreme Court on the issue of due process protection in
custodial sentencing. 5 ° Predictably, the Daniels Court emerges
as the stalwart protector of due process rights, by magnifying an
attorney-contemnor's rights when liberty is threatened. By affording additional precautions, the court not only protects the
basic human right of liberty, but creates a check on abuse. Despite the restriction on the personal embroilment doctrine, the
Daniels Court provides for reference to a detached judge when
confinement is mandated.' 5 This safeguard is not limited to citations and punishments imposed at the completion of the
trial.' 5 2 Hence, Daniels depicts a wide range of constitutional
rights, not previously contemplated under New Jersey contempt
law.
In clarifying the procedures attendant summary resolutions,
perhaps the court should have more thoroughly addressed the
often criticized appellate review. 153 Traditionally, appellate review has been deemed the most prominent safeguard. 154 This
view is based upon the absence of certain procedural rights at the
adjudicatory phase.' 55 The Daniels Court acquiesced in the general view that appellate de novo review functions as a judicial failsafe against due process diminishment. 5 6 Although the court
See Comment, supra note 2, at 193.
Id. Contra In re Carton, 48 N.J. 9, 25, 222 A.2d 92, 101 (1966) (good motive
does not excuse willful disobedience).
150 The Daniels Court extended the due process rights of a custodially sentenced
contemnor under Codospoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506 (1974) and Cheff v.
Schachenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966). See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
151 Daniels, 118 NJ. at 72, 570 A.2d at 427.
148

149

152

Id.

See Kuhns, supra note 5, at 118-21.
Id. at 118-19. The appellate court's ability to check abuse should not be understated. According to a survey conducted from 1960 through 1972, 60% of the
federal and state contempt cases were subsequently reversed on appeal. See Dorsen
& Friedman, Disorder in the Court: Report of the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York, Special Committee on Courtroom Conduct, at 233-34 (1973).
155 See-Kuhns, supra note 5, at 118-19.
156 Daniels, 118 N.J. at 62, 570 A.2d at 422 (citing In re Yengo, 84 NJ. 111, 135,
417 A.2d 533, 546 (1980)). It should be noted that some appellate courts confine
153
154
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recommended an adequate record for review, it failed to address
the implications found in Sacher v. United States,'5 ' namely that appellate courts may be disinclined to leaf through a verbose trial
record. ' 5 Perhaps the court should have emphasized increased
appellate scrutiny on review. The court itself recognized the intrinsic limitation of appellate review.' 59 Although the appellate
division in Daniels considered some extraneous evidence, 160 generally review is confined to the record.' 6 ' Perhaps appellate
courts, in appreciating the difficulties of transcribing a tone of
voice, non-verbal gestures and surrounding circumstances,
should be more willing to consider external evidence. 6 2 If not,
then the predominant due process safeguard could become the
one most subject to manipulation.
The Daniels decision should also be acclaimed for its instructional guidance to all lawyers. While encouraging responsible
lawyering, the court evinced that theatrics and disrespect will be
castigated. 163 Although the court found that an attorney's adjudication of contempt results in minimal consequence, an attorney-contemnor may suffer greatly. By nature, attorney contempt
citations will result in harm to professional reputation." 6 Additionally, they may severely undermine the attorney-client relationship. 165 Further, the New Jersey Supreme Court's Stanley
decision acknowledged that beyond contempt citation, attorneys
are also subject to review by an ethics board.' 66 This procedure
1 67
could result in severe public reprimand and/or suspension.
A dangerous issue intrinsically related to attorney-contemnor predicaments, however, was not addressed by the Daniels
Court, that is, the consequential effect summary attorney-contheir inquiry to whether there has been an abuse of discretion at the trial level. See
e.g. In re Gustafson, 650 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1981).
157 343 U.S. 1, 18-20 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting).
158 Id. at 18 (Black, J., dissenting).
159 See Daniels, 118 N.J. at 57, 570 A.2d at 420. Although witnesses filed affidavits
contradicting the record's illustration of defendant's conduct, the court noted that
"[w]e must deal with the record as we have it." Id.
160 In re Daniels, 219 N.J. Super. 550, 564, 530 A.2d 1260, 1267-68 (App. Div.
1987).
161 See Note, supra note 5, at 580.
162 Id.
163 Daniels, 118 N.J. at 72, 570 A.2d at 427.
164 See Comment, supra note 2, at 193.
165 Id.
166 See In re Stanley, 102 N.J. 244, 507 A.2d 1168 (1986). See supra notes 72-80
and accompanying text.
167 See Comment, supra note 2, at 193.
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tempt adjudication may have on the client's right to an impartial
tribunal. Although judges are held to be paragons of objectivity,
these men and women are still vulnerable to human weakness.
Impartiality should not be a "given." Judicial assignment of a
penalty to the client for actions of his advocate is not inconceivable. Again a need for judicial restraint is mandated. In light of
such a threat to judicial neutrality, courts should require a more
stringent standard of obstruction. Although the Daniels decision
provides for immediate assessment of the level of misconduct,' 6 8
it did not elaborate on the line between minor attorney disruption and punishable obstruction. Nonetheless, by encouraging
professional responsibility and respect, perhaps Daniels sought to
eradicate perpetual reference to the Shakespearean view of the
legal profession.169
Doreen Ann Yanik
168
169

In re Daniels, 118 N.J. 51, 67, 570 A.2d 417, 425 (1990).
"The first thing we do, let's kill all the lawyers." Shakespeare, Henry VI, Pt. II.

Act IV. Sc. 2.

